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(2001) Synthese 126 (3).
On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism
mind-body identity and supervenience
Ausonio Marras
pp. 407-426
As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity and supervenience.
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Marras, A. (2001). On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: mind-body identity and supervenience. Synthese 126 (3), pp. 407-426.
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