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(2009) Synthese 171 (3).
In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9322-x
Full citation:
Coliva, A. (2009). Self-knowledge and commitments. Synthese 171 (3), pp. 365-375.
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