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(2001) Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer.
I do not intend to offer a full analysis of belief, but only to make explicit the basic assumptions about beliefs that underlie the arguments I employ. These assumptions should be uncontroversial. In particular, they are compatible with any current theories of mind except for eliminativism and perhaps naive behaviourism. It is widely accepted that behaviourism, whether naïve or sophisticated, has failed, so I shall not argue against it here. I discuss belief eliminativism briefly in Section 2.3.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_2
Full citation:
Cheyne, C. (2001). Beliefs and facts, in Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 11-22.
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