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In the twentieth century there has been a debate on whether natural language is adapted to its human tasks or whether it has essential defects which make it unsuitable as a medium for expression and the communication of thought. Why did such questions arise? Russell et al. dreamed of a language which would serve as a mirror, reproducing and reflecting the eternal structure of Reality and Truth. Why was there this desire for an eternal language of permanent, universal meanings? The dream of an exact language, which goes back to Plato, was at its most powerful in seventeenth-century Europe, during the time of religious warfare and the need for religious toleration. A renewed dialogue was needed among theologians with contrasting views. Leibniz et al. believed there had to be a universal language to serve as an instrument of reason. The period from the Renaissance to the present time has also been one of great uncertainty in the religious, cosmological and social spheres hence a further appeal for rationality in science and language. Today the problem is less one of religious toleration than of racial and cultural diversity. Today's project concerns the building of compatible transnational television and computer links. The obstacles, such as cultural conflicts and a lack of international understanding, are greater. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that it is one thing to perfect an instrument and quite another to ensure that it is put to just, virtuous or even rationally discriminating use. An exact language, rational method and a united science are the three dreams of rationalism. They are still dreams. Why? The move from science of matter and energy towards that of information means that the distinction between pure and applied science is blurring as theory and praxis merge. The increase in technical interventions in the natural world is giving rise to an increasingly uncertain world in which we are less confident in our ability to forecast or limit their effects.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-1731-5_6

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