Repository | Book | Chapter

In this chapter, I will discuss the problem of metaphysical realism, of the existence of a reality in itself, an absolute reality constituting the transcendent co unterpart of our cognitiveacts. I will connect the problem of metaphysical realism to the opposition between scientific realism and instrumentalism specific to the philosophy of science. By 'scientific realism" and "instrumentalism", I refer to two different positions on the problem of the existence of the "theoretical" entities posited by science. The scientific realist maintains that there is no reason to assume a different ontic attitude to the existence of objects such as chairs and tables on the one hand and electrons and neutrinos on the other: from a general point of view, apart from specific doubts, both kinds of entities have an equal claim to existence. On the contrary, the instrumentalist contends that only observable objects really exist, while theoretical entities are nothing else but useful calculating devices — "representative fictions", as Bain said¹ — introduced in order to organise and to predict experience.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9040-2_6

Full citation: