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Let us assume for now that we at least sometimes interpret, explain and predict one another's behaviour by employing something like FP. We do not attribute beliefs and desires to other people in a vacuum. When we do so, we take for granted not only that the other person is already in a world but that we are both in the same world. Furthermore, it is not simply a matter of assuming the same shared context in every instance. Aspects of an interpreter's situation will be shared with that of the interpreted to varying degrees and interpersonal understanding may be aided considerably by an appreciation of what both parties have in common. This need not take the form of an analogy between self and other, which starts with "I take the world to have a certain character' and moves from this to "he takes the world to have the same character'. Instead, as I will show, it can take the form "the world has this character' and "we are both in it'. In other words, an understanding that at least some aspects of a situation are shared is not assigned to others in the form of a belief system but presupposed. For example, when trying to pass a person in a busy shop, one might think "he wants to get to the checkout' but one would not ordinarily think "he believes he is in a shop'. That we are in a shop is not a belief that each party attributes to the other.

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-230-62529-7_3

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